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1. 
on together affidavits, is no as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C 
56( c ). On appeal the Appellate Court liberally construes the entire record favor of the 
nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Clark 
v. Spokesman-Review, 163 P.3d 216,219, 144 Idaho 427,430 (Idaho 2007)Steele v. Spokesman-
Review, 138 Idaho 249,251, 61 P.3d 606, 608 (2002). If the evidence reveals no disputed issues 
of material fact, summary judgment is proper. Id. 
2. In a defamation action, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant: (1) 
communicated information concerning the plaintiff to others; (2) that the information was 
defamatory; and (3) that the plaintiff was damaged because of the communication. See Gough v. 
Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173,177,249 P.2d 192,194 (1952). As a fourth element, when a 
publication concerns a public official, public figure, or matters of public concern and there is a 
media defendant, the plaintiff must also show the falsity of the statements at issue in order to 
prevail in a defamation suit. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-76, 106 
S.Ct. 1558, 1563-64, 89 L.Ed.2d 783, 791-92 (1986). Finally, if the plaintiff is a public figure, 
the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), 
standard applies, and the plaintiff can recover only if he can prove actual malice, knowledge of 
falsity or reckless disregard of truth, by clear and convincing evidence. Clark v. Spokesman-
Review, 163 P.3d 216,219, 144 Idaho 427,430 (Idaho 2007); Steele, 138 Idaho at 252, 61 P.3d 
at 609; Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 339, 563 P.2d 395, 397 (1977). 
3. The New York Times standard applies to a public figure and he or she will 
recover only ifhe or she can prove actual malice, knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of 
truth, by clear and convincing evidence. Clark v. Spokesman-Review, 163 P.3d 216,219 144 
Idaho 427, 430 (Idaho 2007); See Steele, 138 Idaho at 252, 61 P.3d at 609; Bandelin, 98 Idaho at 
339, 563 P.2d at 397. 
4. On a summary judgment motion by a defendant in a defamation action, the 
plaintiff must produce evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact and evidence a jury 
could find is clear and convincing the defendant acted with "actual malice." Clark v. Spokesman-
Review, 163 P.3d 216,219 144 Idaho 427,430 (Idaho 2007). 
5. When a claim or part of a claim must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, 
generally on a motion for summary judgment the Idaho Appellate Courts do not consider 
whether a party has produced clear and convincing evidence, but only "whether the evidence is 
sufficient to create a triable issue of fact." Country Cove Dev., Inc. v. May, 143 Idaho 595, 599, 
150 P .3d 288, 292 (2006). However, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the United States 
Supreme Court standard for ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a defamation case 
which requires that the trial judge to bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof 
necessary. i.e., and to "independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to 
cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of a judgment not supported by clear and 
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evidence of 'actual malice.' "Clark v. Spokesman-Review, 163 P.3d 216,219, 144 
430 (Idaho 2007); 117 at 790 at 356 
at 1 at 
6. courts a judgment novo. v. 
Spokesman-Review, 163 P.3d 216, 144 Idaho 427 (Idaho 2007); Post Falls Trailer Park, 131 
Idaho at 636,962 P.2d at 1020." Id at 222 and 433 
7 ~ Deciding whether speech is of public or private concern requires a court to 
examine the 111content, form, and context'" of that speech, "'as revealed by the whole record."' 
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172, 79 U.S.L.W. 4135 09-
751; Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at 761, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (quoting Connick, supra, 
at 147-148, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708); Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 790 P.2d 347, 
(Idaho 1990). 
8. In First Amendment cases, the court is obligated "to 'make an independent 
examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not constitute a 
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."' Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), 131 
S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172, 79 U.S.L.W. 4135 09-75I;Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
United States, Inc., Page 454 466 U.S. 485,499, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (quoting 
New York Times, supra, at 284-286, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686). 
9. In considering content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is 
necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was 
said, and how it was said. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 
172, 79U.S.L.W. 4135 09-751. 
10. A speaker's personal motivation for his or her speech should be considered and 
may remove the speech from the province of public concern and the protection of the First 
Amendment. Tayoun v. City of Pittston, 39 F.Supp.3d 572,581 (M.D.Pa. 2014). 
11. In examining the content, form and context of alleged defamatory speech it is 
proper for the court to consider any pre-existing relationship or conflict between the speaker and 
the person defamed. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172, 
79 U.S.L.W. 4135 09-751; Tayoun v. City of Pittston, 39 F.Supp.3d 572, 581 (M.D.Pa. 2014); 
Gleason v. Smolenski, No. SC 19342, (Connecticut Nov. 2015) 
In examining the content, form and context of alleged defamatory speech it is proper for 
the court to consider any pre-existing relationship or conflict between the speaker and the person 
defamed. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172, 79 U.S.L.W. 
4135 09-751; Tayoun v. City of Pittston, 39 F.Supp.3d 572,581 (M.D.Pa. 2014); Gleason v. 
Smolenski, No. SC 19342, (Connecticut Nov. 2015) 
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12. The First Amendment does not protect '-'Tll-'Pt·n made for some purpose 
privilege is Greene v. Tinkler, , 21, 
1 
13, The first amendment cannot be as a or veil intentionally tortious 
conduct that is only tangentially related to the claimed matter of public concern. Gleason v. 
Smolenski, No. SC 19342, (Connecticut 2015); See Holloway v. American Media, Inc., supra, 
947 F.Supp.2d 1261-65 (first amendment did not, as matter oflaw, shield tabloid newspaper 
from intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in light of allegations that it knowingly and 
maliciously published false information about death and burial of plaintiff's missing daughter, 
given preexisting animus between parties); cf. United States v. Sergentakis, United States 
District Court, Docket No. 15CR33 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2015) (defendant's accusations 
that victim had engaged in child molestation and animal cruelty could be protected under first 
amendment in other contexts, but not in cyberstalking and witness retaliation case wherein they 
were "thinly veiled" revenge for victim's cooperation with investigation that led to defendant's 
guilty plea on other charges); People v. Little, Docket No. 4-13-1114, 2014 WL 7277785, *7 
(Ill.App. December 22, 2014). But cf., contra., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 
496,510 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2429 (1991); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 
U.S. 657,666, 109 S. Ct. 2997 (1989); Clark v. Spokesman-Review, 163 P.3d 216, 144 Idaho 427 
(Idaho 2007). 
14. In attempts to distinguish between public and private concerns, courts have placed 
emphasis on the speaker's motivations for the speech under the context element of the inquiry--
primarily personal motivations for the speech may remove speech from the province of public 
concern. Tayoun v. City of Pittston, 39 F.Supp.3d 572, 581 (M.D.Pa. 2014);See, e.g., Feldman v. 
Philadelphia Haus. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 829 (3d Cir. 1994)." [P]ublic speech 'cannot constitute 
merely personal grievances."' Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399,412 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting 
Feldman, 43 F.3d at 829). 11 Speech that is necessary or appropriate to enable citizens to make 
informed decisions about the operation of their government is of public concern, while speech by 
public employees addressing individual personnel disputes and grievances is not. 11 Pool v. 
VanRheen, 297 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 
15. A plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through 
circumstantial evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 
260 U.S. App.D.C. U.S. App.D.C.9, 66, 817 F. 2d 762, 789 (en bane), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
870 (1987), and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any 
relation to the actual malice inquiry." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 
U.S. 657,668, 109 S. Ct. 2997 (1989); Clark v. Spokesman Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 
(Idaho 2007): Gardner v. Hollifield, 97 Idaho 607, at 610, 549 P.2d 266, at 269 (Idaho 1976). 
16. "The limited purpose public figure is an individual who voluntarily injects him or 
herself or is drawn into a specific public controversy, thereby becoming a public figure on a 
limited range of issues." (Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577, italics 
added (Ampex).) 




court Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 1980) (Waldbaum) 
explained that "[t]o determine whether a controversy indeed existed and, if so, to define its 
contours, the judge must examine whether persons actually were discussing some specific 
question." (emphasis added) (Id. at p. 1297, italics added, fn. omitted; accord Reader's Digest 
Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 254-255 ["courts should look for evidence of 
affirmative actions by which purported 'public figures' have tl-1rust themselves into the forefront 
of particular public controversies"],(italics added.) It is therefore clear that the public controversy 
into which a limited purpose public figure thrusts itself must be one that existed before the 
defendant made the defamatory statements at issue, and the alleged defamation must be 
germane to the plaintifrs participation in that preexisting controversy. (emphasis added). 
Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577 emphasis added; Life Vantage Corp. 
v. MacFarland, A 141057 California Court Of Appeals, First District Fifth Division (2015) 
(Unpublished). 
19. The standard ofreview of a trial court's decision of issues involving the 
introduction of evidence, is under an abuse of discretion [281 P.3d 120] standard. Clair v. Clair, 
281 P.3d 115, 153 Idaho 278 (Idaho 2012); State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 
1231 (2003). The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence. Id. at 521-22, 81 
P.3d at 1231-32. "Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless the ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the 
party is affected." Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 
(1995). 
20. The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the 
decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.[l] State v. Shutz, 143 
Idaho 200, 202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006). A district court's improper exclusion of evidence 
will be overturned on appeal ifit affects a party's substantial right. Clair v. Clair, 281 P.3d 115, 
153 Idaho 278 (Idaho 2012); Perception Const. Afanagement, Inc. v. Bell, 254 P.3d 1246, 1249, 
1250 151 Idaho 250 (Idaho 2011); I.R.E. 103; I.R.C.P. 61(a); Burgess v. Salmon River Canal 
Co., Ltd., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995). 
21. Evidence that is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime 
charged is generally admissible. State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217,221 (2008). 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; see also Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221. Whether a 
fact is of consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented 
by the parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,671,227 P.3d 918,925 (2010). We review 
questions ofrelevance de novo. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 
(1993); State v. Houser, 41540 (unpublished) (Idaho App. 2014). 
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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
56(c). Under this standard, disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party. Where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question oflaw 
remains, over which this Court exercises free review. Huber v. Lightforce USA, Inc., 41887 
(Idaho December 15, 2015); Trotter v. Bank ofl'l.Y .Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 845-46, 275 P.3d 
857, 860-61 (2012) (footnotes, internal case citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
23. When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for the 
Appellate Court is the same standard as that used by the district court in ruling on the motion. 
Summary judgment is appropriate if" the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). Disputed facts 
should be construed in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. The Appellate Court 
exercises free review over questions oflaw. Huber v. Lightforce USA, Inc., 41887 (Idaho 
December 15, 2015); Fuller v. Dave Callister, 252 P.3d 1266, 1269, 150 Idaho 848, 851 (Idaho 
2011); 149 Idaho 609,613,238 P.3d 209,213 (2010) (quoting Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45, 
218 P.3d 388, 389 (2009)). 
24. The standard of review on appeal from an order granting summary judgment is 
the same standard that is used by the district court in ruling on the summary judgment. Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file 
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter oflaw. McCann v. McCann, 275 P.3d 824 (Idaho 2012). 
25. When an Appellate Court reviews an order dismissing an action pursuant to 
summary judgment, after viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the non-
moving party, the Court will ask whether a claim for relief has been stated. The issue is not 
whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to 
support the claims. 145 Idaho 670, 672-73, 183 P.3d 758, 760-61 (2008) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). In addition, "the Court reviews an appeal from an order of summary 
judgment de novo, and the Court's standard of review is the same as the standard used by the 
trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Taylor v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642, 
648, 149 Idaho 826, 832 (Idaho 2010); Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 
394,224 P.3d 458,461 (2008). 
26. The Appellate Court employs an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a 
district court's denial of a motion to amend a complaint to add additional causes of action. Spur 
Prod. Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 43, 122 P.3d 300, 302 (2005). When reviewing an 
exercise of discretion on the part of a district court, this Court considers: " (1) whether the court 
correctly perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the 
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27. An Appellate Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous.; As to questions of law, the Court exercises free review. Rumberger v. 
Rumberger, 995 P.2d 809,811, 134 Idaho 39, 41 (Idaho 2000); See Jensen v. Jensen 128 Idaho 
600,604,917 P.2d 757, 761 (1996). 
28. The designation of a public figure may rest on two alternative bases: 'In some 
instances an individual may achieve such persuasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public 
figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects 
himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a 
limited range of issues.' 418 U.S. at 351, 94 S.Ct. at 3013. (emphasis added).Bandelin v. 
Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337,563 P.2d 395 (Idaho 1977). 
29. A citizen's participation in community and professional affairs does not 
automatically render him or her a public figure. 'It is preferable to reduce the public-figure 
question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's 
participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation (or invasion of privacy).' 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3013, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); 
Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395 (Idaho 1977). 
30. Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community and 
pervasive involvement in ordering the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a 
public figure for all aspects of his life. Rather, the public figure question should be determined by 
reference to the individual's participation in the particular controversy giving. (emphasis added) 
Gertzv. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-352, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3000, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 
(1974). 
31. One test used to determine if a person is a public figure is whether the person 
occupies "a position of such 'persuasive power and influence' that he could be deemed one of that 
small group of individuals who are public figures for all purposes." Walston v. Reader's Digest 
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 165, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 2706, 61 L.Ed.2d 450, 458 (1979). Wiemer v. Rankin, 
117 Idaho 566, 790 P .2d 34 7, (Idaho 1990) 
32. "A second test to determine if a person is a public figure is whether the person has 
thrust himself 'to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the 
resolution of the issues involved.'" Id. at 165, 99 S.Ct. at 2706, 61 L.Ed.2d at 459 (quoting Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,345, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d 789,808 (1974)). In 
that circumstance the person would be a public figure for the limited purpose of comment on his 
connection with, or involvement in, the particular public controversy. ( emphasis added). 
Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 790 P.2d 347, (Idaho 1990). 
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34. Liability for libel may attach when a negative characterization of a person is 
coupled with a clear but false implication that the author is privy to facts about the person that 
are unknown to the general reader. If an author represents that he has private, first-hand 
knowledge which substantiates the opinions he expresses, the expression of opinion becomes as 
damaging as an assertion of fact. Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 790 P.2d 347, 353(Idaho 
1990). 
35. The Idaho Supreme Court has rejected the idea that in cloaking statements as 
mere opinion a speaker cannot be held liable for slander: "The important consideration, then, is 
not whether the particular statement fits into one category or another, but whether the particular 
article [statement] provided sufficient information upon which the reader could make an 
independent judgment for himself." Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 572, 790 P.2d 347,353 
(Idaho 1990). 
36. A "reckless disregard" for the truth, however, requires more than a departure from 
reasonably prudent conduct. "There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the 
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." The standard is a 
subjective one--there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant 
actually had a "high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity." 491 U.S. at----, 109 S.Ct. at 
2696, 105 L.Ed.2d at 589 ( citations omitted; emphasis added); Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 
566, 790 P.2d 347, (Idaho 1990). 
37. The United States Supreme Court has refused "to create a wholesale defamation 
exemption for anything labeled opinion (citation omitted), recognizing that "expressions of 
'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact," and that a reasonable trier of fact could 
find that the so-called expressions of opinion could be interpreted as including false assertions as 
to factual matters. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 
L.Ed.2d 447, 59 USLW 4726 (1991). 
38. In ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial court is to liberally construe 
the entire record in favor of the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions in that party's favor. Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 138 Idaho 249,251, 61 P.3d 606, 
608 (2002). Clarkv. Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216, (Idaho 2007). 
39. Malice is defined for first amendment purposes as knowledge of falsity or 
reckless disregard of truth. Its essence is a knowing state of mind on the part of the publisher. 
Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337, 563 P.2d 395 (Idaho 1977). 
8-APPELLANTS'BRIEF 
41. Rhetorical hyperbole is not slander because, under the circumstances the most 
careless reader [hearer] could not believe the statement was stating actual facts about the public 
person involved. Milkovitch v. Lorrain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990). 
42~ In a defa1nation action, actual malice is a ki~ovvlcdgc of falsity· Oi reckless 
disregard of the truth. Bandelin, 98 Idaho at 339, 563 P.2d at 397. Mere negligence is 
insufficient; the plaintiff must demonstrate that the author in fact entertained serious doubts as to 
the truth of his publication or acted with a high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity." 
Masson, 501 U.S. at 510, 111 S.Ct. at 2429 (cite omitted) internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
43. The standard of actual malice is a subjective one. Wiemer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 
566, 575, 790 P.2d 347,356 (1990) citing Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 
491 U.S. 657,688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2696 (cite omitted) (1989) (emphasis removed and internal 
quotations omitted). 
44. Although actual malice is a subjective standard, in a case involving a public 
figure, self-interested denials of actual malice from the defendant can be rebutted with other 
evidence. Clark v. Spokesman Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 (Idaho 2007); Gardner v. 
Hollifield, 97 Idaho 607, at 610, 549 P.2d 266, at 269 (Idaho 1976). 
45. A party responding to a summary judgment motion is not required to present 
evidence on every element of his or her case at that time, but must rather establish a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party. 
Thomson v. Idaho Insurance Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P. 2d 1034, 1037; Farm 
Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994). 
46. In Idaho the rule is that in order to maintain a libel action without a plea of special 
damages, a plaintiff must establish the words complained of are libelous per se. Weeks v. M-
Paragraph Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 516 P.2d 193 (1973); Jenness v. Co-operative 
Publishing Co., 36 Idaho 697,213 P. 351 (1923); Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502, 
275 P.2d 663 (1954). 
47. It is a matter of law or a matter of fact whether certain words are libelous per se. 
If the language used is plain and unambiguous it is a question of law for the Court to determine 
whether it is libelous per se, otherwise it is a question of fact for the trier of fact. Weeks v. M-
Paragraph Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 516 P.2d 193 (1973); Bistline v. Eberle, 88 Idaho 
473,401 P.2d 555 (1965); See also, Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 75 Idaho 502 at 508. 275 
P.2d 665, at 666 (1954). 
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48. In order to be libelous per se, 
court can presume as a matter law that 
up to public hatred, --· .. -·, .. 
words, must on 
defamatory words must be of 
to 
standing in the community, and tend to expose to public hatred, 
disgrace. The imputation must be one which tends to affect plaintiff in a class of society and 
annoys or irks plaintiff, and subject him to jests or banter, so as to affect his feelings. Weeks v. 
M-P Publications, Inc., 95 Idaho 634, 516 P.2d 193 (1973); Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 
Idaho 173, at 179, 249 P.2d 192, at 195 (1952). 
49. "Defamation is the communication of false information which tends to impugn 
the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation of the person or entity about whom the statement is 
made, or exposes that person or entity to public hatred, contempt or ridicule. Libel is a form of 
defamation. Libel is he communication of defamatory information by written words, or by some 
form that has the characteristics of written words. Slander is a form of defamation by any other 
means." Idaho Civil Jury Instruction 4.80; Gough v. Tribune-Journal Co., 73 Idaho 173, 177, 
249. 
50. IDJI 4.82-Elements of defamation - general case 
In order to prove a claim of defamation, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the 
following elements; 
1. The defendant communicated information concerning the plaintiff to others; and 
2. The information impugned the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation of the 
plaintiff or exposed the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule; and 
3. The information was false; and 
4. The defendant knew it was false, or reasonably should have known that it was 
false; and 
5. The plaintiff suffered actual injury because of the defamation; and 
6. The amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
See Carver v. Ketchum, 53 Idaho 595, 26 P.2d 139; Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 171, 118 
P.2d 729; Adair v. Freeman, 92 Idaho 773,451 P.2d 519. 
51. IDJI 4.82.5 - Elements of defamation claim public official or public figure 
The plaintiff is a ["public official" or "public figure"]. In order to prove a claim of 
defamation against the defendant in this case, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of 
the following elements; 
1. The defendant communicated information concerning the plaintiff to others; and 
2. The information impugned the honesty, integrity, virtue or reputation of the 
plaintiff or exposed the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt or ridicule; and 
3. The information was false; and 
4. The plaintiff was damaged because of the communication; and 
5. The amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff must prove the following additional element by clear and convincing 
evidence: 
6. The defendant knew the information was false, or acted with reckless disregard 
for its truth, at the time the information was communicated to others. 
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Nature of the Case 
(i) Appellants, Candace "Andi" Elliott (Andi) and For The Love Of Pets Foundation, 
Inc. (Foundation), appeal the dismissal on summary judgment of their suit for defamation against 
Respondent, Steven Murdock (Murdock), for a statement he made during a call-in radio talk 
show (The Neal Larson Show) on March 22, 2012, originating from Idaho Falls: 
"If you listen - you know, words have meanings. If you listen to Andi's words, she 
claims not to be an animal activist or a humane society activist but that's kind of a bit 
windy. When she said that private property just in her statement to you is alright and 
everything, she thinks she is above the law, she's trespassed numerous times, there's 
ongoing court case in Jefferson County where she got the judge disputed cause she's 
special. She has to have a different judge to come in out of the area. Her shenanigans 
cost Jefferson County taxpayers a numerous amount of dollars. West Jefferson Landfill 
has a place for deceased livestock. People with the same mentality as Andi is what's 
done this to this horse market. We used to sell these slaughter horses. And in Portland, 
Oregon there's a horse meat market. In European countries horses are consumed by 
people all the time. And Andi's humane society puts .02% of the money they hit 
everybody up back into the care of animals."( emphasis added). 
(Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of Defendant Steven L. Murdock's 
Motion For Summary Judgments, p.7). A complete transcript of the radio talk show in 
question is set forth in the plaintiff's deposition, Exhibit 28). 
It is the defendant's last statement (bolded) that is the subject of this appeal, which appellants 
believe is slanderous per se, falsely accusing Andi and the Foundation of obtaining and misusing 
donated funds fraudulently or under false pretenses. While conceding ( arguendo) Plaintiff Andi 
Elliott may be a "limited public person" on the issue of animal welfare, Appellants appeal the 
district judge's findings of fact not supported by the record or relevant to any issue of animal 
welfare or the horse slaughter market. Appellants' appeal the court's striking entirely the 
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declaration to 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint against defendant for defamation in Jefferson County 
district court on March 19, 2014, alleging Defendant's statements made about them on a radio 
call-in talk show on March 22, 2012, were defamatory. Defendant answered, raising several 
defenses, including the statements were true or substantially true; that the statements were 
protected opinion; and that the statements were protected under Article I, Section 9 of the Idaho 
Constitution, and by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Discovery was undertaken, and Defendant's counsel, from San Francisco, deposed 
Plaintiff for two days, conducting the same in two parts, the first on June 27, 2014 and 
concluding on November 13, 2014, at the conclusion of which he announced he would complete 
the Plaintiffs deposition at a later date. On February 17, 2015 the defendant filed a motion for 
summary judgment, accompanied by: 1) a Memorandum of points and authorities in support of 
defendant Murdock's motion for summary judgment; 2) a Compendium of evidence and 
declarations in support of defendant Murdock's motion for summary judgment --listing 71 
exhibits; 3) the Declaration of Blair Olsen in support of motion for summary judgment-
including 11 of the exhibits listed in the Compendium; 4) the Declaration of Ray Wong in 
support of motion for summary judgment; 5) the Declaration of Robin Dunn in support of motion 
for summary judgment-referencing at least 6 of the exhibits listed in the Compendium; and 6) 
the Declaration of Steven L. Murdock in support of motion for summary judgment. Defendant 
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"''"''"''-'-'""" the hearing of motion for March 
15 a 
additional time to complete and to prepare 
exhibits to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs' motion for extension was 
heard telephonically on March 9, 2015, and on March 12 an order was entered granting 
Plaintiffs request for extension, re-setting the summary judgment for hearing April 20, 2015. 
On March 19, 2015 Plaintiffs served three subpoenas for taking depositions of the 
defendant, Steve Murdock; the defendant's son, Chance Murdock; and Ronald Hillman, the 
latter two considered by Plaintiffs as critical potential non-party adverse witnesses for the 
Plaintiffs. On March 25, 2015 Defendant's counsel filed a Motion For Protective Order And To 
Quash Subpoenas, to which Plaintiffs objected, and with their objection requested in the 
alternative either additional time to respond to Defendant's motion for summary judgment, or to 
allow the depositions proceed on shortened notice. The Court heard the matter March 26, 2015, 
granting the defendant's motion to quash and ruling Plaintiffs planned depositions were not to 
be taken. 
On April 2, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Motion To Amend Pleadings, together with an 
Objection And Motion To Strike Hearsay, seeking an order to exclude from the Court's 
consideration on summary judgment, documents and exhibits containing hearsay and otherwise 
claimed by Plaintiffs to be inadmissible. 
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On April 6, 2015 Plaintiffs filed their to 
a 
Brief In Opposition To Summary Judgment). 
On April 13, 2015 Defendant filed his Reply A1emorandum Of Points And Authorities In 
Support Of Defendant Steven Murdock's Motion For Summary Judgment, as well as an objection 
and motion to strike Plaintiffs' exhibits (Defendant Steven Murdock's Objections And Motion To 
Strike Exhibits Offered By Plaintiffi· ln Opposition To Defendant Murdock's Motion For 
Summary Judgment), as well as an objection and motion to strike Plaintiffs' declaration 
( Objection And Motion To Strike Of Defendant Steven Murdock To Declaration Of Plaintiff In 
Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment) . Both Plaintiffs' and Defendant's 
motions were both heard April 20, 2015 together with the parties' oral arguments on summary 
judgment. 
On April 30, 2015 the Court entered summary judgment for the defendant (Decision And 
Order Re: Motion For Summary Judgment) after excluding the entire declaration and exhibits 
of the Plaintiffs (Decision and Order Re: Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Hearsay And Amend 
Complaint And Defendant's Motion To Strike Plaintiff's Declaration, Strike Exhibits And Take 
Judicial Notice Of Court Proceedings). The court also granted Plaintiffs motion to strike the 
defendant's specific exhibits and statements objected to by the Plaintiffs. The Court also entered 
an order ( Order Re: Limitation On Filing) limiting the future submission of documents to the 




relied instead on admissions and stipulations he believed were found the record, together 
records Defendant had asked the trial court to take judicial knowledge of. The findings of 
the trial court were as follows: 
"The parties have stipulated that: 
I. Ms. Elliott has written at least dozens of letters to the editor regarding political and 
animal rights issues. Deposition of Candace Elliott (Elliott Depo.) pp. 154-158. 
2. Ms. Elliott is a state coordinator for the Tea Party Patriots. Elliot Depo. p. 52. 
3. As part of her duties as a state coordinator, Ms. Elliott organizes and speaks at public 
rallies. Elliott Depo. p. 53. 
4. Ms. Elliott announced her candidacy for Sheriff of Jefferson County through the 
media. Elliott Depo. p. 288. 
5. Ms. Elliott presents herself through the media as a political advocate. Elliott Depo. p. 
301. 
6. Ms. Elliot uses the foundation to help fund her animal advocacy activities. Elliott 
Depo. p. 
7. For the Love of Pets Foundation relies on public donations for its operation. 
Plaintiffs brief in opposition to summary judgment p. 24. 
8. Ms. Elliot used to be the president of the Humane Society of the Upper Valley. 
Elliott Depo. p. 18. 
9. The For the Love of Pets Foundation is similar to a humane society. Elliott Depo. p. 
47. 
10. That there was an advertisement in the public media mentioning that the Humane 
Society used less than 1 % of the donations received for the benefit of animals. 
Admitted in Open Court. 
11. Ms. Elliott was convicted one time for trespassing. Elliott Depo. pp. 59-60. 
12. Ms. Elliott was charged multiple times for trespassing. Elliott Depo. p. 54. 
13. Defendant's brother and sister-in-law were witnesses to one such charge for 
trespassing. Plaintiffs brief in opposition to summary judgment pp. 21-22." 
Plaintiffs urge the trial court erred 1) in striking the entire declaration and exhibits of the 
plaintiffs ( or at least so much of the relevant portions thereof were offered in opposition to the 
declarations and exhibits proffered by the defendant in support of summary judgment); 2) in not 
examining or considering the defendant's motives in making the defamatory statements against 
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concern being at 
statement 
and on factors as 
Plaintiff's civic actions and writings not involving animal welfare (Decision And Order, p.3, 
"Stipulated Facts" nos. 2,3, 4,5), (and including the Foundation by association). 
to 
Appellants contest several of the court's findings, including, "Ms Elliott uses the 
foundation to help fund her "animal advocacy activities" ("Stipulated Facts" no. 6); the court's 
finding of a stipulation on the record, "That there was an advertisement in the public media 
mentioning that the Humane Society used less than 1 % of the donations received for the benefit 
of animals" (Decision And Order, pp.3, Finding! O); that "[t]he Foundation is simply a 
mechanism by which Ms, Elliott thrusts herself into the public controversy surrounding the 
treatment of animals and, therefore, is also a public figure" (Decision And Order, p.5). The 
plaintiffs appeal the court's finding the Foundation to be a public figure "by association with Ms. 
Elliott" (Decision And Order, p.5), and that the Foundation "uses its resources to alert the public 
of the mistreatment of animals" (Decision And Order, p.5). The plaintiffs appeal the Court's 
finding the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to overcome a summary judgment 
under either a negligence or clear and convincing standard (Decision And Order, p.7), especially 
so after the Court struck her declaration and exhibits. 
While appellants do not contest the court's conclusion "Ms. Elliott is a public figure in 
the geographic area of Southeastern Idaho covered by the radio program referenced in the 
matter" with respect to the welfare of animals, Appellants appeal the failure of the court, by 
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exclusion Plaintiff's declaration exhibits, to examine the "content, and context" and 
Murdock's statement were removed the protection of the First Amendment; 
and whether if Defendant's statement was germane to the public issue either being discussed on 
the radio talk show (animal welfare in general terms, or as Defendant's counsel stated, the "horse 
slaughter market" (Defendant's Reply Memorandum, p. 7) and distinguish the particular 
motivation of the defendant in making 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Hamer, Jefferson County, Idaho (population 51 
according to Google (citing the United States Census Bureau 2013) or 584 by another Google 
search) in Jefferson County, Idaho. Plaintiff, For The Love Of Pets Foundation, Inc., is a non-
profit domestic 501 C corporation set up and operated by Ms. Elliott to assist her and others 
financially in animal welfare efforts. It relies on donations for its operation, principally from Ms. 
Elliott, but has received donations from others also. In years past (more than two) Ms. Elliott 
had acted as the president of the Humane Society Of The Upper Valley. 
On March 22, 2012 Plaintiff, Candace "Andi" Elliott, called the Neal Larson radio show 
on KID radio, 590/1240 AM, and 92.1 FM., joining in the discussion of the subjects being 
discussed, including neglected animals, whether new animal welfare laws were needed, the 
horse slaughter market and the proper way to dispose of unwanted horses. ( a complete transcript 





Andi Neal, hi this is Andi from Hamer. 
Neal Larson Hi Andi. How are you? 
Andi I'm fine thins. I'm calling about the horse situation and Cala, if you ever have 
any questions you can always call the Sherriff' s Department and as for a 
welfare check. 
Cala Oh good to know. 
Andi And always be sure - you're entitled to a follow-up report so always be sure of 
this so be sure to ask for that from the Sherriff s Department. 
Cala Okay. 
Andi But, I just to tell you all this has been going on for 15 to 20 years and I was 
first involved with this situation back in 2008 and then again in 2009 and this 
owner is notorious. She's very powerful in the Horse 
Association and I don't why nobody has tried to follow through with this. I 
have some really cruel pictures of the horses back in 2008. In 2009 when I was 
calling back down to , she literally - I was - Danica Lawrence, a 
Channel 3 TV reporter and I were out in the roadway and this owner literally 
threatened to run us down with a car. Four or five officers came out. Anyhow, 
somehow the situation was resolved but not much was done. I don't 
understand. 
Neal Larson So, Andi is this an issue where she doesn't have the money and the resources 
to buy enough ford and to care for the animals properly? I mean, what is going 
on here that she has these horses even years later that aren't being taken care 
of? 
Andi Well, as of yesterday I was told by a friend that she has sitting 
on her place. I was also told by a friend that used to show horses with her that 
I her horses have always looked very marginal, so this is not something new. Of 
course, she continues to breed and, you know, there comes a point that you just 
can't afford to feed them anymore, but notwithstanding you need to put a 
bullet in her head or, you know, you put out a call for help and there will be 
people that will come in an help. 
Neal Larson Okay. Andi we - I don't know if you heard that last hour but we had a caller 
call in. She has horses. She lives fairly close to this woman and what does a 
person do? If they have animals, they can't afford them anymore and even if 
they're large animals - cows or horses, pigs, whatever it is - they can't afford 
to feed them anymore - what should they do? 
Andi Well, one person a couple of years ago, he had six horses he could no longer 
take care of. He put them in the trailer. Took them to the Bonneville County 
Landfill and shot them. 
Neal Larson And that's legal? 
Andi I don't know. It's legal to kill your own animals, yes. 










Andi, what do you say to people who say hey, you know what, this is her 
personal property, she can do whatever she wants, it's not our role to interfere 
with what she's <loin on her personal pro erty? 
Well, what I really want to say is hogwash, but what I would say 
professionally is that we have laws and the laws dictate that you must provide 
proper food, shelter and medical care for these animals in Chapter 25 of the 
Idaho Code. I think it's 35-(3511) or something like that. So we do have laws 
that should be enforced. The problem we have and I'm dealing with the 
situation in Madison County right now, two little ponies were so neglected, 
their hooves were so long and curled up like elves shoes and the whole foot has 
become deformed now and they both had to be euthanized. You know, we 
have laws but we have trouble getting law enforcement to enforce it and I've 
always said as meager as Idaho laws are, if we would just enforce what we 
have, the animals would be so much better. You know private property rights 
are great and all, but these are living, breathing, pain feeling animals that we're 
dealin with here. 
Yeah. 
And I've always said I'm not a tree hugger, I'm not an animal rights activist. 
I'm an animal welfare advocate. I just simply treat them humanely. That's all I 
have. 
Andi thank you for the call. We appreciate it and we know that this issue is 
near and dear to you and we a reciate you calling in today. 
In response to the Plaintiffs comments, and after other callers had called on the issue of 
horse slaughter (Defendant's Exhibit 28, Declaration Of Ray Wong), Steve Murdock 
(identifying himself as "Steve from Harner") called saying: 
If you listen - you know, words have meanings. If you listen to Andi's words, she claims 
not to be an animal activist or a humane society activist but that's kind of a big windy. 
When she said that private property just in her statement to you is alright and everything, 
she thinks she is above the law, she's trespassed numerous times, there's ongoing court 
case in Jefferson County where she got the judge disputed cause she's special. She has to 
have a different judge to come in out of the area. Her shenanigans cost Jefferson County 




same mentality as Andi is what's done this to 
care Memorandum of Points And In 
Defendant Steven L. Murdock's Motion For Summary Judgment, p. 8, February 17, 
2015)." 
In response to these statements, Plaintiff~ for herself and the Foundation, filed suit against 
Murdock for defamation, alleging several of the foregoing statements to be slanderous. 
Ultimately, however, in opposing summary judgment Plaintiffs narrowed their claims of slander 
to the defendant's statements as fact of the plaintiff having trespassed "numerous" times, and his 
statement, "And Andi's humane society puts .02% of the money they hit everybody up back into 
the care of animals." (Wong's reply memorandum, p. 12, 4/13/15). It is only the latter statement 
that is at issue in this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
a. Did the District Judge err in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant? 
b. Did the District Judge err in striking in their entirety the declaration and exhibits 
of Candace Elliott filed in opposition to defendant's motion for summary judgment? 
c. Did the District Judge err in his findings of fact on which he based his 
conclusions and order for summary judgment? 
d. Can an institution or entity be found to be a public person or entity because of 
association (i.e. Did the District Judge err in finding the Foundation a public entity by 
association to Ms. Elliott (Andi))? 
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e. Did District Judge err in complaint? 
f. err 
~'"""""""' as to 
g. Was the defendant's statement regarding the plaintiff's germane to the particular 
public issue being discussed? 
h. Was it error for the District Judge (in excluding the plaintiffs' exhibits and the 
declaration of Ms. Elliott, as well as the defendant's own declarations), to not consider the 
defendant's prior interaction with the plaintiff (set forth in her declaration and exhibits) and 
examine the motives for his statement ? 
i. Are the plaintiffs entitled to show by circumstantial evidence the defendant's 
prior interactions with the plaintiffs, and the animus of the defendant in making his statement? 
J. In Idaho can the animosity and motive of a defendant toward a limited public 
figure plaintiff, remove his declarations from the protection of the First Amendment or the 
protections of the Constitution of the State of Idaho? 
k. Was the defendant's statements germane to the particular public issue being 
discussed on the talk show? 
ARGUMENT 
It is respectfully urged the trial court erred in striking in its entirety the declaration and 
exhibits of Ms. Elliott, offered in opposition to the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
Without such the court found she had not offered sufficient evidence to overcome summary 
judgment either under a negligence standard or one of clear and convincing evidence of malice. 
CITE HERE Had the Court not struck her statements and exhibits in their entirety, as will be 
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plaintiffs a or to find 
some statements were not but it is 
urged the trial court should not have struck them wholesale, but only those items having nothing 
to do with the case or the defendant's allegations being responded to. It should be remembered, 
in proffering her declaration and exhibits found by the trial court to be not relevant, plaintiff was 
responding to the defendant's allegations, most of which were also not relevant, not true or 
without foundation. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has indicated for issues involving the introduction of evidence, 
reviews of the trial court's decision is under an abuse of discretion [281 P.3d 120) standard. 
Clair v. Clair, 281 P.3d 115, 153 Idaho 278 (Idaho 2012); State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521, 81 
P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and to 
determine whether a witness is qualified as an expert. Id. at 521-22, 81 P.3d at 1231-32. "Error 
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless the ruling is a 
manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the party is affected." 
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995). 
The question of whether evidence is relevant is reviewed de novo, while the decision to 
admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho 200, 
202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006). A district court's improper exclusion of evidence will be 
overturned on appeal if it affects a party's substantial right. Perception Const. Management, Inc. 
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254 P.3d 1246, 1249, 1250 151 Idaho 250 (Idaho 2011, 103; 61 
1 (1 
There can be no argument the exclusion of Plaintiff's declaration and exhibit did not 
affect the plaintiffs' substantial rights. 
Evidence that is relevant to a material and disputed issue ... is generally admissible. State 
v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217,221 (2008). Evidence is relevant if it has "any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401; see 
also Stevens, 146 Idaho at 143, 191 P.3d at 221. Whether a fact is of consequence or material is 
determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties. State v. Johnson, 148 
Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010). In this case, it is urged, the plaintiffs had a duty to 
respond to the allegations propounded by defendant seeking summary judgment. 
A party responding to a summary judgment motion is not required to present evidence on 
every element of his or her case at that time, but must rather establish a genuine issue of material 
fact regarding the element or elements challenged by the moving party. Thomson v. Idaho 
Insurance Agency, Inc., 126 Idaho 527, 530, 887 P. 2d 1034, 1037; Farm Credit Bank of 
Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994). 
Appellate Courts review questions of relevance de novo. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 
764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993); State v. Houser, 41540 (unpublished) (Idaho App. 2014). 
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can It is urged, the 
trial court not excluded Plaintiffs' exhibits and declaration in opposition to summary judgment, a 
review of the exhibits and statements in Plaintiffs' declaration show there was/is sufficient 
evidence. Although discovery had not been completed, Plaintiffs' declaration and exhibits 
contain, at least circumstantially, both in terms of quantity and quality by a clear and 
convincing standard, sufficient evidence by which a reasonable jury can find the defendant made 
his statements with malice, a knowledge of falsity, or in reckless disregard of the truth (i.e., with 
a "high degree of awareness of probable falsity" (Clark, supra, at 221)). 
A plaintiff is entitled to prove the defendant's state of mind through circumstantial 
evidence, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979); Tavoulareas v. Piro, 260 U.S. 
App.D.C. U.S. App.D.C.9, 66, 817 F. 2d 762, 789 (en bane), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987), 
and it cannot be said that evidence concerning motive or care never bears any relation to the 
actual malice inquiry." Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,668, 
109 S. Ct. 2997 (1989); Clark v. Spokesman Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 (Idaho 2007): 
Gardner v. Hollifield, 97 Idaho 607, at 610, 549 P.2d 266, at 26. 
As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Gardner v. Hollifield, 97 Idaho 607, at 610, 
549 P.2d 266, at 269 (Idaho 1976): 
. . . We take note that we are here dealing with difficult if not impossible, matters 
of plaintiff's proof. First, the matter of the supervisor of an employee making a 
determination and then expressing an opinion as to the employee's competence or 
incompetence is one that is highly subjective. Secondly, the proof of the superintendent's 
state of mind as being motivated by the intent to make a false statement as contrasted to 
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the voicing of genuinely held belief is also difficult if not impossible and must resort to 
extrinsic circumstantial factors. enormous difficulties 
not 
statements concerning Gardner's competence as a teacher, Campbell knew 
statements to be false and that Gardner was thereby damaged. Such allegations, if 
proven, present material issues of fact for resolution by a trier of fact and do not fall 
within the ambit of conditional privilege." (emphasis added). Gardner v. Hollifield, 97 
Idaho 607, at 610, 549 P.2d 266, at 269 (Idaho 1976). 
That a public figure plaintiff can use circumstantial evidence to prove necessary malice is 
also shown in the case of Clark v. Spokesman Review, 144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 (Idaho 
2007): 
Actual malice is not defined as an evil intent or a motive arising from spite. 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496,510 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2429 (1991). 
In a defamation action, actual malice is a knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the 
truth. Bandelin, 98 Idaho at 339, 563 P.2d at 397. Mere negligence is insufficient; the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the author in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth 
of his publication or acted with a high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity." 
Masson, 501 U.S. at 510, 111 S.Ct. at 2429 (cite omitted) internal quotations and 
citations omitted). The standard of actual malice is a subjective one. Wiemer v. Rankin, 
117 Idaho 566, 575, 790 P.2d 347, 356 (1990) citing Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. 
v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 2696 ( cite omitted) (1989) 
(emphasis removed and internal quotations omitted)). However, although actual malice 
is a subjective standard, self-interested denials of actual malice from the defendant 
can be rebutted with other evidence. ( emphasis added). Clark v. Spokesman Review, 
144 Idaho 427, 163 P.3d 216 (Idaho 2007); Gardner v. Hollifield, 97 Idaho 607, at 610, 
549 P.2d 266, at 269 (Idaho 1976). 
Since the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in Clark v. Spokesman Review, Id., (which 
with its progeny seemingly indicate the motives and personal animosity of the declarant 
are not relevant), the United States Supreme Court, in Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 
(2011), 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172, 79 U.S.L.W. 4135 09-7519, ruled otherwise, 
and indicated in First Amendment cases, the court is obligated "to 'make an independent 
examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the judgment does not 
constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."' Snyder v. Phelps, 562 
U.S. 443 (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172, 79 U.S.L.W. 4135 09-751;Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., Page 454 466 U.S. 485,499, 104 S.Ct. 
1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984) (quoting New York Times, supra, at 284-286, 84 S.Ct. 710, 
11 L.Ed.2d 686). Further, that in considering content, form, and context, no factor is 
dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, including 
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what was said, where it was said, and 562 
11), 131 1207, 179 1 
The United States Supreme Court, in Phelps, Id., indicated in examining the content, 
form and context of alleged defamatory speech it is proper for the court to consider any pre-
existing relationship or conflict between the speaker and the person defamed. Snyder v. Phelps, 
562 U.S. 443 (2011), 131 S.Ct. 1207, 179 L.Ed.2d 172, 79 U.S.L.W. 4135 09-751; Tayoun v. 
City of Pittston, 39 F.Supp.3d 572,581 (M.D.Pa. 2014); Gleason v. Smolenski, No. SC 19342, 
(Connecticut Nov. 2015); cf Greene v. Tinker, 332 P.3d 2 l(Alaska 2014). 
In subsequent decisions by other courts, relying on Snyder, supra, it is held a speaker's 
personal motivation for his or her speech should be considered and may remove the speech 
from the province of public concern and the protection of the First Amendment. Tayoun v. 
City of Pittston, 39 F.Supp.3d 572, 581 (M.D.Pa. 2014). 
The First Amendment does not protect speech made for some purpose other than for 
which the privilege is given. Greene v. Tinkler, 332 P. 3d, 21, 36 (Alaska 2014); Gleason v. 
Smolenski, No. SC 19342 (Connecticut 2015). 
In attempts to distinguish between public and private concerns, courts have placed 
emphasis on the speaker's motivations for the speech under the context element of the inquiry--
primarily personal motivations for the speech may remove speech from the province of public 
concern. Tayoun v. City of Pittston, 39 F.Supp.3d 572,581 (M.D.Pa. 2014);See, e.g., Feldman v. 
Philadelphia Haus. Auth., 43 F.3d 823, 829 (3d Cir. 1994)." [P]ublic speech 'cannot constitute 
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personal grievances."' Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 412 2003) 
at or 
operation IS concern, speech by 
public employees addressing individual personnel disputes and grievances is not." Pool v. 
VanRheen, 297 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002). 
In the instant case, a review of the content, form and context under which the 
defendant's statements were made, as contained in the stricken declaration and exhibits of the 
Plaintiff (as well as the defendant and his declarants) show a pre-existing relationship and 
conflict between the parties, and the animus of the defendant when he made his statements. Such 
evidence, stricken by the trial court, demonstrate the defendant's motives for his statements were 
not to promote public discourse or comment on a matter of public issue, but to harm the 
plaintiffs. Such evidence show his statement was "thinly veiled revenge" (Gleason v. Smolenski, 
No. SC 19342, (Connecticut 2015) for the plaintiff's having called for a welfare check of 
Defendant's brother's horses (paragraphs 31-34, Declaration Of Plaintiff In Opposition To 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, and Exhibits 6, 7 thereto), triggering a complaint 
by the brother's neighbor for trespass against the plaintiff, for which she was acquitted. Other 
examples of the defendant's animus to the plaintiff, his son and witnesses submitting 
declarations for the defendant are also contained in the plaintiff's declaration and exhibits, and 
amply demonstrate the likelihood Plaintiff's ability to show by clear and convincing evidence the 
defendant's "actual malice" and reckless disregard for the truth of his statements. 
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courts hold cannot as a or veil 
IS 
l V. 
947 F.Supp.2d 1261-65 (first amendment did not, as matter oflaw, shield tabloid newspaper 
from intentional infliction of emotional distress claim in light of allegations that it knowingly and 
maliciously published false information about death and burial of plaintiffs missing daughter, 
given preexisting animus between parties); cf. United States v. Sergentakis, United States 
District Court, Docket No. I5CR33 (NSR) (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2015) (defendant's accusations 
that victim had engaged in child molestation and animal cruelty could be protected under first 
amendment in other contexts, but not in cyberstalking and witness retaliation case wherein they 
were "thinly veiled" revenge for victim's cooperation with investigation that led to defendant's 
guilty plea on other charges); People v. Little, Docket No. 4-13-1114, 2014 WL 7277785, *7 
(Ill.App. December 22, 2014). But cf., contra, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 
496, 510 111 S.Ct. 2419, 2429 (1991); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 
U.S. 657,666, 109 S. Ct. 2997 (1989); Clarkv. Spokesman-Review, 163 P.3d 216, 144 Idaho 427 
(Idaho 2007). 
It is urged the defendant's animus defamandi and personal motivation for his speech 
removed his statement from the purpose which the Constitution of the United States and the 
constitution of the State ofldaho protect, i.e., public comment on public issues; and that he was 
"dressing intentionally tortious conduct in the garb of the First Amendment" Gleason v. 
Smolenski, Id. As the Connecticut Supreme Court has said, "Even speech that relates to a matter 
of public interest loses its protection ... if it is uttered with an intent merely to harass and with no 
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to persuade, or communicate." ( Gleason v. 19342, 
Also, if the plaintiff is a public person ( or a limited public person), courts are required to 
examine the particular public issue in play and if the defendant's statement is germane to the 
matter of public interest being debated. This is illustrated by the case of Ampex Corp. v. Cargle 
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577, wherein the California Court of Appeals, states: 
The limited purpose public figure is an individual who voluntarily injects him or herself 
or is drawn into a specific public controversy, thereby becoming a public figure on a 
limited range of issues. (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323,351; Reader's 
Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 CaL3d 244,253 [208 CaLRptr. 137].) Copp v. 
Paxton (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 829, 845-846 [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 831] sets forth the elements 
that must be present in order to characterize a plaintiff as a limited purpose public figure. 
First, there must be a public controversy, which means the issue was debated publicly 
and had foreseeable and substantial ramifications for nonparticipants. Second, the 
plaintiff must have undertaken some voluntary act through which he or she sought to 
influence resolution of the public issue. In this regard it is sufficient that the plaintiff 
attempts to thrust him or herself into the public eye. And finally, the alleged defamation 
must be germane to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy. 
That the defendant's statements must be germane to the plaintiffs participation in a particular 
controversy is further shown in a recent unpublished opinion the California Court of Appeals, 
in Life Vantage Corp. v. MacFarland, A141057, California Court Of Appeals, First District 
Fifth Division (2015) (Unpublished), wherein the Court stated: 
"The limited purpose public figure is an individual who voluntarily injects him or herself 
or is drawn into a specific public controversy, thereby becoming a public figure on a 
limited range of issues." (Ampex Corp. v. Cargle (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1577, 
italics added (Ampex).) To become a limited purpose public figure, a party must inject 
itself into "an existing public controversy[.]" (Carver v. Bonds, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at 
p. 353, italics added.) In what our colleagues in Division One have called "a much cited 
analysis" (Copp v. Paxton (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 829, 845), the court in Waldbaum v. 
Fairchild Publications, Inc. (D.C. Cir. 1980) 627 F.2d 1287 (Waldbaum) explained that 
"[t]o determine whether a controversy indeed existed and, if so, to define its contours, the 
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judge must examine whether 
(Id. at p. 1297, italics added, 
(1984) 37 244, 
,,...,r,rl,c,,rl 'public 
public controversies"], italics It is that the public controversy into 
which a limited purpose public figure thrusts itself must be one that existed before the 
defendant made the defamatory statements at issue, and the alleged defamation must be 
germane to the plaintiff's participation in that preexisting controversy. (Ampex, supra, 
128 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577.)" Life Vantage Corp. v. AfacFarland, Al41057, California 
Court Of Appeals, First District Fifth Division (2015) (Unpublished) (balded italics 
added). 
It is urged the defendant's statements were not germane to the issue being discussed on the radio 
talk show. The subject of solicitation or misuse of charitable funds for the care of animals was 
never brought up nor advocated by the plaintiff. These were subjects injected into the 
conversation from left field by the defendant, solely for spite. Again, the language of the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Wiemer is instructive: 
"The Supreme Court has stated that" '[w]hether ... speech addresses a matter of 
public concern must be determined by [the expression's] content, form, and context ... as 
revealed by the whole record.'" Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 
U.S. 749, 761, 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2946, 86 L.Ed.2d 593, 604 (1985) (quoting Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1690, 75 L.Ed.2d 708, 720." Wiemer v. 
Rankin, 117 Idaho 566, 570-571, 790 P.2d 347,352 (Idaho 1990. 
In his order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment (Decision And Order 
Re: Motion For Summary Judgment, April 30, 2015) the trial court recites the following as 
having been stipulated to: 
"The parties have stipulated that: 
14. Ms. Elliott has written at least dozens ofletters to the editor regarding political and 
animal rights issues. Deposition of Candace Elliott (Elliott Depo.) pp. 154-158. 
15. Ms. Elliott is a state coordinator for the Tea Party Patriots. Elliot Depo. p. 52. 
16. As part of her duties as a state coordinator, Ms. Elliott organizes and speaks at public 
rallies. Elliott Depo. p. 53. 
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17. Ms. Elliott announced her -~,, .... " .. ~v for Sheriff through the 
Elliott Depo. 288. 
8. 
19. Ms. uses to Elliott 
Depo. p. 
20. For the Love of Pets Foundation relies on public donations for its operation. 
Plaintiff's brief in opposition to summary judgment p. 24. 
21. Ms. Elliot used to be the president of the Humane Society of the Upper Valley. 
Elliott Depa. p. 18. 
22. The For the Love of Pets Foundation is similar to a humane society. Elliott Depo. p. 
47. 
23. That there was an advertisement in the public media mentioning that the Humane 
Society used less than 1 % of the donations received for the benefit of animals. 
Admitted in Open Court. 
24. Ms. Elliott was convicted one time for trespassing. Elliott Depo. pp. 59-60. 
25. Ms. Elliott was charged multiple times for trespassing. Elliott Depo. p. 54. 
26. Defendant's brother and sister-in-law were witnesses to one such charge for 
trespassing. Plaintiff's brief in opposition to summary judgment pp. 21-22 ." 
Plaintiffs do not recall, and have not found in the record, the basis of the Court's above 
finding of fact number 10, allegedly "Admitted in Open Court." It is urged such finding is in 
error and without foundation. 
Similarly, Plaintiffs believe in his finding the plaintiffs to be public figures, the trial 
court's reliance on factors: (1) with regard to political issues; (2) and (3), her activity as a state 
coordinator for the Tea Party Patriots; (4) her announcing her candidacy for sheriff\; and (6), her 
political advocacy for the Tea Party, was improper. A citizen's participation in community and 
professional affairs does not automatically render him or her a public figure. 'It is preferable to 
reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and 
extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation 
(or invasion of privacy).' Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,352, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3013, 41 
L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho 337,563 P.2d 395 (Idaho 1977). Likewise, 
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a 
1 at 167, I, at 61 at 117 
Idaho 566, 790 P.2d 347, (Idaho 1990). 
SUMMARY 
It was error for the Court to exclude the entire declaration and exhibits of Andi Elliott, 
thereby disallowing the plaintiff's opportunity to oppose the summary judgment. Her 
declaration and exhibits offer ample evidence by which a court and a jury can find by clear and 
convincing evidence the defendant acted with malice. The court properly should have excluded 
only those portions not relevant to the case or not given in response to the allegations of the 
defendant and his declarants. The plaintiff's statements and her exhibits proffered were provided 
in rebuttal to the allegations of the defendant and his declarants, and the plaintiff had a duty to 
offer such. To the extent plaintiff's declaration and exhibits were not relevant it was only due to 
the fact she was responding to non-relevant or untrue allegations of the defendant. 
Additionally, several of the trial court's findings of fact are not relevant, or accurate or 
founded on the record. The reliance by the court in looking at the plaintiff's civic activity and 
writings, umelated to animal welfare, do not make her a public figure. 
The trial court erred in not examining the content, form and context of the defendant's 
statement, and failing to examine the defendant's improper motive for his statements. 
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The defendant's statement was thinly veiled 
it to concern 
the (evidenced of 
remove his statement from the province of public issue or concern. He should not be allowed, as 
the Connecticut Supreme Court said, to dress his intentional tortuous conduct in the garb of the 
First Amendment. The purpose of protecting free speech on issues of public concern were not a 
concern of the defendant's speech, and he should not be allowed the protection of the First 
Amendment. 
It is respectfully urged the trial court erred in disallowing the plaintiff to proceed with 
deposing the defendant and witnesses Plaintiff deemed vital to opposing summary judgment, and 
failing to allow the Plaintiff to amend her complaint. 
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